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Abstract
Obtaining knowledge and skill achievement through peer learning-
can lead to higher academic achievement. However, peer learning
implementation is not just about putting students together and hoping
for the best. At its worst-designed, peer learning may result in one
person doing all the effort for instance, or may fail to encourage the
students to interact enough with the task and so enhance the task in
hand.
This study proposes a mechanism as well as an instructional design
to foster well-organized peer learning based on game theory (PD PL).
The proposed mechanism uses prisoner’s dilemma and maps the strat-
egy and payoff concepts found in prisoner’s dilemma onto a peer learn-
ing atmosphere.
(PD PL) was implemented during several sessions of four univer-
sity courses and with 142 computer engineering students. The study
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results indicated that PD PL was beneficial and favourable to the
students. Further analysis showed that the PD PL had sometimes
even enhanced learning by up to 47.2%.
Keywords: Cooperative/Collaborative Learning, Improving classroom
teaching, Interactive learning environment, Teaching/learning strategies.
1 Introduction
Peer learning(PL) can be defined as obtaining knowledge and skill achieve-
ment through learning among status equals Topping (2005). In this method,
people of the same social group work as amateur instructors in pairs and help
each other to teach and learn from each other O’Donnell and King (2014).
The students who learn via this method have a better understanding of the
content of the lesson, have higher motivation, and learn faster O’Donnell
et al. (2011). Given the positive research results of peer learning, it would
make sense to harness these benefits by designing the classroom activities
that lead students to peer learning Wessel (2015); Whitman and Fife (1988).
However, peer learning is not putting students together and hoping for
the best. For instance, it may result in one person doing all the work or
may fail to lead the students to engage enough interaction and enhance the
task in hand consequently; hence the need for a well-designed structure Top-
ping (2005). This paper proposes a novel game theoretical mechanism for
implementing peer learning.
With the aid of mathematical models, game theory analyzes the method
of cooperation or conflict between intelligent and rational decision makers
Myerson (1991). In this atmosphere, each decision maker tries to increase
their payoff through interaction with other decision makers. Today many ap-
plications of game theory habe been reported in various fields. For example,
we can refer to cases such as auctions, bargaining and collective decision-
making in economies, and voting in the fields of politics and security as well
as privacy in the context of networking. Besides, as Cohen et al. Cohen
et al. (2018) state, game theory can be applied in the area of education to
enhance learning results. For instance, it has been applied to investigate the
effect of strict or lenient scoring on increased or decreased effort of students
or instructors Correa and Gruver (1987), to study the impact of the number
of students in a class on their success Correa (1993, 1997), to model methods
of effort-making by instructors and students Correa (2001b), to model the
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interactions of instructor and student Correa (2003), to model the participa-
tory or competitor behavior between instructors Correa (2001a), to evaluate
a student’s cooperative behavior Hemesath (1994); Su et al. (2018); Waddell
and Peng (2014), to develop digital game-based learning for the concept of
prisoner’s dilemmaMoniaga et al. (2017), and to create a competition among
students Burguillo (2010). Our study is different from the mentioned works
because in fact, our contribution is applying prisoner’s dilemma (PD)-which
is a famous instance of game theory- to prepare a peer learning environment
and motivate the students to actively participate in their stages of learning.
In peer learning, a successful effort by both of the students results in
increased learning outcomes, but an unsuccessful effort by both parties results
in lower learning outcomes. In this method, the non-contributing students
are referred to as free riders, who enjoy the benefits of group activities without
participation and responsibility in the group work. This behavior of students
in peer learning is the same as that of the player in prisoner’s dilemma.
Prisoner’s dilemma shows how it’s possible for two rational people to tend not
to cooperate (defect) despite their cooperation possibly leading to a higher
payoff for both of them. In PD, the payoff of a participant who puts in more
effort will be less than the one who makes less effort. In this case, the person
who makes less effort is an example of a free rider. On the other hand, in
PD, effort is made to lead participants towards having better and greater
cooperation. As in PD, greater effort made by both participants in peer
learning results in increased learning improvement, which is the main goal of
our suggested mechanism.
In this paper, we first present a novel mechanism based on peer learning
and prisoner’s dilemma. Secondly, as in a PD situation where the cooperation
of both participants leads to a better result, our proposed mechanism tries
to encourage the students to make a greater effort to enhance learning their
own achievement. Finally, we demonstrate that the presented mechanism
could enhance learning outcomes.
To investigate the effect of our mechanism on learning performance, it
has been implemented on four groups of students in different courses. A
statistical test has been used to analyze the results of pre-test and post-test
exams taken before and after mechanism implementation respectively. Since
the test contains requirements such as data imputation, we will also explain
how to utilize and implement the mechanism and how to analyze the results,
in the section devoted to our methodology. The result of its implementation
indicates that the proposed mechanism has a positive impact on personal
3
learning outcomes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After introducing peer
learning and game theory in section 2, a literature review of the application
of game theory concerning learning will be shown in Section 3. In Section 4,
the suggested mechanism will be presented. Section 5 covers its method of
implementation and data collection as well as the method of analyzing the
received data. The result of the analysis, as well as the procurement of the
mechanism, will be discussed in Section 6. In the final sections, a discussion
and conclusion are drawn, and future works are presented.
1.1 Research Questions
This study particularly attempted to answer the following research questions:
• Learning improvement: Does the proposed peer learning mechanism,
enriched by game theory, enhance students’ learning outcomes?
• Free rider prevention: Is PD PL able to stop the free rider problem?
• Subjective evaluation: How do students evaluate the PD PL process?
2 Background
Since the design of the suggested mechanism is based on game theory and
peer learning, we briefly review these concepts in this section.
2.1 Peer Learning
Peer learning is an educational practice in which students are able to reach
their goals by working together O’Donnell and King (2014). This method
of learning causes the students to not only rely on the instructor and the
syllabus of the book, but also to discuss every opinion concerning themselves
as well as others in the same group. On the other hand, students can easily
discuss their opinions with others in the absence of the instructor. Another
point is that questions and answers can be analyzed from several points of
view other than those of the instructors Wessel (2015).
Topping et al. Topping and Ehly (1998) classify the advantages of peer
learning from the viewpoints of students, instructors, and the educational
system. We will delve into some of them in more details as follows:
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Advantages of the peer learning from the students’ point of view:
• Higher academic achievement
• Improvement in interpersonal relationships
• Improvement in individuality and society (For instance, more feeling of
self-worth, more positive attitudes to institute and learning)
• More optimistic learning atmosphere
• Motivational improvement (for example, more pleasurable and better
opportunities to socialize with peers)
Advantages of peer learning from the instructors’ point of view:
• Instructional development (For instance, raising educational services
and observing individual student performance)
• Classroom management (For example, reducing unsuitable academic
and social behavior, opportunities to teach new appropriate classroom
behaviors)
• Simple implementation
Advantages of peer learning from the educational system point of view:
• A host of strategies for improving student achievement
• A means of raising educational reforms
• A collection of interpositions to simplify addition, improve general
classroom discipline, and avoid academic failure
As the proposed mechanism aims to increase learning through teammates,
peer learning considerations should be taken into account. Topping Topping
(2001) lists the requirements to be clarified in peer learning. He states that
the context, goals, curriculum area, participants, helping technique, contact
method, materials, participants and their training technique, mechanism of
process monitoring, assessment of students’ tactics, evaluation method, and
how to get participants’ feedback should be determined. In the section de-
voted to our methodology (i.e., Section 5), we will explain how to implement
such specifications in our mechanism.
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2.2 Game Theory and Prisoner’s Dilemma
Game theory forms a mathematical model of cooperation and conflict be-
tween intelligent and rational decision makers Myerson (1991). A rational
decision maker tries to maximize his payoff against other decision makers.
The decision maker in game theory is known as the player. In each game,
players work together and in every stage of the game, choose a strategy from
their strategy set. The players take their payoff with respect to the payoff
matrix.
Nash Equilibrium and Pareto Efficiency (Pareto Optimum) are two fun-
damental definitions in game theory, that we explain as follows.
Definition 1. Strategy profile s∗ constitutes a Nash Equilibrium (NE) if each
player i meets the below condition:
ui(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i) ≥ ui(si, s∗−i),∀si ∈ Si, (1)
where, si and s−i are strategy of player i and strategies of remaining
players respectively, and ui(si, s
∗
−i) is the payoff function of player i.
John Nash has shown that at least one mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium
will exist for any finite game Nash (1951). Some points have been mentioned
regarding NE:
• Since each player selects his/her best response to the other players’
choices, NE can be seen as an outcome of mutual best responses.
• The NE definition states that, no player can increase his/her payoff by
deviating unilaterally.
• Accordingly, no player regrets his/her action when they play in a NE.
Definition 2. A strategy profile of a game is (weakly) pareto efficient iff there
is no other strategy profile that would make all players better off Myerson
(1991).
In the proposed mechanism, we apply prisoner’s dilemma, which is a
famous game in game theory. It models the situation where two people who
display rational behavior and know that cooperating together for the same
subject would be beneficial to both of them, but prefer not to cooperate. In
this game, there are two players (Player 1 and Player 2) and each one has a
strategy set {Cooperate, Defect}. Table 1 shows the payoff matrix of this
game in whichShoham and Leyton-Brown (2008):
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a < b < c < d
and
(a+ b)
2
< c
Table 1: Payoff Matrix of Prisoner’s Dilemma
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player 2 is “d”. 
 
 
Table 1: Payoff Matrix of Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
Defect Cooperate 
Player 2 
Player1                    
a, d c, c Cooperate 
b, b d, a Defect 
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a<b<c<d  
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The rows of this table show the strategies of the first player and the
columns show the strategies of player 2. There are two values in each cell of
the payoff matrix. For instance, if the strategy profile (Cooperate, Defect)
is chosen - that is, player 1 chooses “Cooperate” strategy and the player 2
chooses “Defect” - then the payoff of the player 1 is “a” and that of the player
2 is “d”.
In this game, if both players choose the strategy “Cooperate”, the payoff
of both players are “c”. This payoff is higher than what players gained by
choosing strategy “Defect”. While one player chooses “Cooperate” and the
other chooses “Defect”, the payoff of the player who chooses “Cooperate” is
less than the one who chooses “Defect”. For example, if player 1 chooses to
cooperate and player 2 chooses not to cooperate, player 1 obtains payoff “a”
and other gains payoff “d”, and as we mentioned, “a” is lower than “d”.
In the prisoner’s dilemma, NE is the strategy profile (Defect, Defect).
This is due to the fact that none of the players gain more payoff by changing
strategy unilaterally. For example, if the first player chooses the “Cooperate”
strategy instead of “Defect”, he receives “a” which is lower than “d”. The
same condition will happen to the other player.
In this game, the strategy profile (Cooperate, Cooperate) is a pareto
efficiency. That is, the other strategy profile does not contribute any extra
payoff to both players. As an example, by choosing a different strategy profile
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(Cooperate, Defect), player 2 will receive a higher payoff but the payoff of
the first player will be lower.
We will explain the relationship between the suggested mechanism and
prisoner’s dilemma more in Section 4.
3 Related Work
By reviewing the related research on using game theory in a learning context,
we divide these studies into five groups. Some articles model the interaction
between instructor and student Colman et al. (2018); Correa (1993, 1997,
2001b, 2003); Correa and Gruver (1987); Moga et al. (2012); Oltean et al.
(2016). Some other works model the interaction between instructors Correa
(2001a). Beside these articles, there are also articles that use game theory
in evaluating and commentating on students’ cooperation behavior Chiong
et al. (2012); Fernndez-Berrocal et al. (2014); Hemesath (1994); Molina et al.
(2013); Waddell and Peng (2014). Another group of articles use game theory
to train cooperative behavior Fan (2000). Finally, Burguillo (2010); Noorani
et al. (2018) applies game theory to increase competition between students.
In the following, we explain each group in detail.
• Using game theory in modeling instructors’ and students’ in-
teractions: Between 1987 to 2003, Hector Correa procured a series
of works for using game theory in the area of education. Initially, he
was theoretically examining the use of economic theory in education
Correa and Gruver (1987). Then in Correa (1993, 1997), he investi-
gated the correlation between the number of students in a class and
educational achievement. He indicated that as the number of students
in a class rises, the rate of success of the students would be reduced.
These articles had not been implemented.
In 2003, Correa also modeled the interaction between instructors and
students Correa (2003). In this study, instructors and students were
divided into capable/incapable and hardworking/lazy groups. The
achievement function of students was formed as h = a1ts + a2tstc +
a3tstg − a4tc2 − a5tc2 − a6tg2, in which ts and tc denoted the time al-
located by a student and an instructor for a lesson respectively. The
value of tg was the time allocated by an instructor to each student indi-
vidually (as an example, the required time for marking the exam paper
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of a student). Finally, he applied simulation to calculate the values of
a1 to a6 in the NE situation.
Moga et al. Moga et al. (2012) defined the strategy set {Cooperative,
Non-Cooperative} for students, and {Using the classic teaching method,
Using interaction model in teaching} for instructors. Then, they deter-
mined the payoff matrix and NE in order to choose the best educational
policy.
Oltean et al. Oltean et al. (2016) involved the financial outcome.
They defined the strategy set {Study/ Don’t study} for students, and
{Verify/ Don’t Verify} for instructor. In the “Verify”, the instructor
assessed the students via very precise testing. In the “Don’t Verify”,
the financial outcome of the institute was important, and the instruc-
tor had a more lenient approach to evaluating students. Instructors
chose their strategy with respect to the value of three parameters (Pro-
fessional Effort/Risk of Losing Money/Professional Prestige). On the
other hand, students choose their strategies in respect to the parame-
ters (Knowledge/Risk of losing the Degree/Professional Effort). Then
the quality values (H, h, l, L) for the mentioned parameters were con-
sidered, in which H > h > l > L. Finally, after defining the NE of
each scenario, it was calculated.
• Applying game theory in modeling the interaction between
instructors: Correa analyzed cooperative and competitive behavior
between instructors at an educational institute Correa (2001a). He
defined hi = ni × si as an achievement function of the instructor, in
which ni was the number of students who enrolled in the lesson of
instructor i, and si was the number of students who successfully passed
the lesson.
Two instructors could cooperate so that they sought to maximize h =
h1 + h2 = n1s1 + n2s2. In another approach, they could adopt compet-
itive behavior so that finding the NE could solve the problem.
• Applying game theory in evaluating and analyzing cooperative
behavior: Waddell et al. Waddell and Peng (2014) used PD to analyze
the cooperative or competitive behavior of students when they play
PD against a known or unknown person. Hemesath Hemesath (1994)
investigated the effect of nationality, gender and familiarity in PD.
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Molina and et al. in Molina et al. (2013) studied the relation between
the gender of students and their strategy selection in PD. Gray et al.
examined the effects of age on cooperationGray et al. (2017). Fernndez-
Berrocal Fernndez-Berrocal et al. (2014) evaluated the relation between
emotional intelligence and making decisions in choosing a cooperative
or competitive strategy in iterated PD. It concluded that people with
higher emotional intelligence make more effective decisions and they
thought about long term gains.
Chiong et al. Chiong et al. (2012) used evolutionary game theory to
analyze the cooperation behavior of players in group work. In their ex-
periment, active players of non-active groups were transferred to active
groups and non-active players were transferred to non-active groups.
The result of their experiment showed that the active players remained
active and non-active players remained non-active.
• Applying game theory to train cooperative behavior: Fan Fan
(2000) used PD to train cooperative behavior. In this study, partic-
ipants were grouped in pairs. Each participant was given two cards;
one marked with a triangle and one with a circle. Each team member
showed a card to their teammate simultaneously. Table 2 indicates
the payoff matrix of this game. After some sessions, the experimenter
gives a short lecture. This lecture (shown in Figure 1) was designed as
a treatment variable by which students were explicitly told that it was
a good thing to cooperate. The research showed that the proportion of
cooperative individuals increased meaningfully immediately after the
lecture.
Table 2: Payoff Matrix of showing cards gameFan (2000)
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Table 2: Payoff Matrix of showing cards game [26]  
 
 
• Applying game theory to motivate competition: Burguillo Bur-
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Whatever the other child does, playing the  card will always get you more points than 
playing the     ⃝ card. Therefore, if you care only for yourself, the best you could do is to 
play the  card. But then, when the other child arrives at the same conclusion, he (or 
she) will also play the  card, and you will both end up in the worst situation. For the 
two of you, a better result is that you cooperate with each other and both play the     ⃝ 
card, you can then share the toy equally and not waste any time fighting 
 
Figure 1: The ethical text to motivate cooperative behaviour [26]  
 
The difference between this article and our work is that we seek higher learning achievement via Peer 
Learning. 
 
 Applying Game Theory to motivate competition 
The author of work [10]  used PD to motivate competition between learners in order to enhance java 
programming skill. The learners should use java to create a network program to run PD.  
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enhance java programming language. In fact, paper [10]  uses PD as a game, and does not use mathematical 
model of Game Theory. 
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Peer Learning.  In Peer Learning, the effort of both learners results in greater learning outcome. We use the 
payoff as a reward to motivate learners to make all-out effort. Thus, we tell the learners that the total payoff 
they gained will be taken into account for their mid-term score. Therefore, the mechanism motivates the 
learners to make more effort to gain higher payoff.  
On the other hand, we run the mechanism during several sessions. Therefore, if a learner even faces a free 
rider, he can negotiate with the teammate to make more effort or can even change the teammate in the next 
session.  
Below, we describe the proposed mechanism in detail. 
 
3-2- A mechanism based on Prisoner’s Dilemma and Peer Learning (PD_PL) 
Figure 3 illustrates the stages of mechanism PD_PL.  
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Figure 1: The essence of the lecture given by experimenter Fan (2000)
guillo (2010) used PD to motivate competition between students in
order to n ance their java programming skills. The students should
use java to create a network program to run PD. Article Noorani et al.
(2018) proposed a game theoretical approach to stimulate learners to
take p rt i a competition to provid more useful explanations.
3.1 How does PD PL differentiate from related work?
There are distinctions between PD PL a d the me tioned studies. First,
PD PL’s main goal is to enhance learning using peer learning. Second, it
models the interaction between students using prisoner’s dilemma. Thirdly,
PD PL uses PD’s payoff ma rix to determine tud n s’ scoring. Finally, it
was implemented and the result was reported; that is, this study has not
relied solely on simulation or theoretical proof. Future, PD PL applies PD
o pee learning, w ile article B rguillo (2010) defines PD as a java program-
ming exercise, and does not use a mathematical model of game theory.
4 The Pr pos d Mechanism
We aim to design a mechanism based on game theory to enhance learning
outcomes. As mentioned above, we apply prisoner’s dilemma to the proposed
mechanism. In PD, strategy profiles (Defect, Defect) and (Cooperate, Co-
operate) are NE and pareto optimum respectively. The favourite situation
is motivating players to move from NE to pareto optimum to gain higher
payoffs. The same holds true in peer learning in which the effort of both
students results in greater learning outcomes. We use the payoff as a reward
to motivate students to make all-out efforts. Thus, we tell the students that
the total payoff they gained will be taken into account for their mid-term
11
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Figure 2: The stages of PD PL
score. Therefore, the mechanism motivates the students to make more effort
to gain higher payoffs.
On the other hand, we run the mechanism during several sessions. There-
fore, if a student even faces a free rider, he can negotiate with the teammate
to make more effort or can even change the teammate in the next session.
Following, we describe the proposed mechanism in detail.
4.1 PD PL: A mechanism based on prisoner’s dilemma
and peer learning
Figure 2 illustrates the stages of PD PL. In each session where the PD PL
is run, we ask the students to form a group of two students at their sole
discretion. The mechanism is run at the end of some sessions after the
instructor teaches the lesson. We give a sheet to students and ask them to
briefly write about a given concept. This concept arises out of the lesson
taught in that session; the writing of which does not require more than 5 to
10 minutes.
We emphasize to the students that the written text must be understood
by their teammate and that they should help their teammate to eliminate
any probable misunderstanding. After the time determined by the instructor
elapses, we ask the students to swap their sheet with their partner. Then,
we ask students to study theie teammate’s sheet. Afterward, the students
should return the sheet to the owner. We ask students to fill in the requested
information at the bottom of the sheet in order to make sure they have
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studied their partner’s sheet. The requested items include the assessment
of their teammate’s sheet, a self-assessment and an assessment of familiarity
with the teammate.
To evaluate the effect of PD PL on learning improvement, we use a pre-
test before and a post-test after the mechanism’s implementation. Pre-test
and post-test are at the same degree of difficulty and both are related to the
concept that we ask students to write about on the sheet.
We run the mechanism during several sessions. An important point is
that the students do not know in which sessions the mechanism is run.
At the end of each PD PL execution, the score of each student is calcu-
lated. This score is based on the student’s and the teammate’s sheets. We
will further explain about score calculation.
After each execution of mechanism, we place the scores in Edmodo, that
is an educational network. People could register as an instructor, student,
or parent and use different facility of this educational network. Some fa-
cilities are creating a new course, leaving and responding messages publicly
and privately, making quizzes, preparing exams and exercises, observing the
students’ activities, and uploading the exercises.
Knowing their own and their teammate’s score, students may decide to
change the teammate in the next session of mechanism execution, or make a
decision about the amount of information that they write in their sheet.
4.2 Scoring Method
As mentioned above, we use pre-test and post-test to evaluate the student
knowledge before and after executing the mechanism. Maximum score of
pre-test, post-test and the sheet in each session of PD PL implementation is
2.
In PD PL, Equation (2) is used to calculate the score of each member
of a group in which Gi and Gj refere to score of sheet of student and his
teammate, respectivly.
Gi +Gj
2
× 1.2 (2)
Table 3 shows some calculated scores concerning teammate sheets.
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Table 3: The scores gained by teammates based on their sheets’ scores
8 
 
In a word, pre-test is assumed to show what the learner really learned from instructor. The formula indicates 
that if the learner writes all their information (condition Si >= Pre-testi) on the sheet, the VSi will be equal to 
Si; otherwise, the learner takes score according to information that they write on the sheet. As when a 
learner obtains score 1 in pre-test and 0.5 in their sheet, we assume the learner writes half of their real 
knowledge. Therefore, the value of their sheet is half of the total score; that is score one. 
In PD_PL, learner i and j, that are teammate, take score according to VSi and VSj. The score given to each 
learner in the same group is calculated as formula (2). 
 (2) 
(VSi+VSj)
2
×1.2 
 
 
Table 4: The scores gained by teammates based on their Si 
 
The obtained scores of teammate Gj Gi 
0 0 0 
1.2 2 0 
1.2 0 2 
2.4 2 2 
 
 
Table 4 shows some calculated scores concerning teammate sheets. As an example, if both of them take 
score 2 on their sheets (Value of Sheet for both of them is 2), the final score of each is 2.4, and if one takes 
0 and the other takes 2, the score of each is 1.2. 
 
3-2- Relation between PD_PL and Prisoner’s Dilemma 
In Game Theory, payoff is equal to the benefit minus the cost. As stated, if VSi and VSj are assumed to be 
the Value of Sheet of learners i and j, respectively, the score of each learner is calculated according to 
formula (2). So payoff of each learner i is benefit (that is calculated by formula (2)) minus the cost (VSi). 
 Payoff  of learner i=
(VSi+VSj)
2
×1.2 -VSi = 0.6 VSj − 0.4VSi 
In the same way: 
 
Payoff  of learner j=0.6 VSi − 0.4VSj 
Now, if both learners have the same VS, then: 
 
Payoff  of learner i = Payoff  of learner j=0.2 VSi = 0.2 VSj 
When a learner writes more and other (teammate) writes less, for example, VSi>VSj, we have PD condition: 
VSi>VSj  ⟹ 
0.6 VSi>0.6 VSj  
-0.4 VSj>-0.4 VSi
 ⟹ 0.6 VSi-0.4 VSj > 0.6 VSj-0.4 VSi ⟹ Payoff  learner j > Payoff  learner i 
It means the learner (player) who makes higher effort, gains lower payoff than the learner (player) who 
makes lower effort.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Relation between Prisoner’s Dilemma and PD PL
Payoff is equal to benefit minus cost. As stated, if Gi and Gj are assumed to
be h score of sheet of students i and j respectively, the score of each student
is calculated according to Equatio (2). So the payoff for each student i is
benefit (that is calculated by Equation (2)) minus the cost (Gi). Hence, the
payoff for student i is
(Gi +Gj)
2
× 1.2−Gi, which is equal to 0.6Gj − 0.4Gi.
In the same way, the payoff of student j is equal to 0.6Gi − 0.4Gj
When one student writes more and the other (teammate) writes less, for
example, Gi > Gj, we have a PD condition:
Gi > Gj then 0.6Gi > 0.6Gj and −0.4Gi < −0.4Gj
We conclude 0.6Gi − 0.4Gj > 0.6Gj − 0.4Gi, which means the payoff for
student j is higher than that for student i. It means the student (player)
who makes the most effort gains a lower payoff than the student (player) who
makes the least effort.
Table 4: The payoff matrix of students in PD PL
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Table 5: The payoff atrix of learners in PD_PL 
 
 
0 
 
2 
Player 2 
 Player 1 
-0.8,    1.2 0.4,     0.4 2 
0,     0 1.2,    -0.8 0 
 
To more clarification, the payoffs of learners in border scores have indicated in Table 5. As an example, if 
value of a learner’s sheet is zero and value of his teammate is two, the score of each one is (0+2)/2*1.2=1.2. 
Therefore, the payoff of learner is equal to 1.2-0=1.2 and payoff of teammate is 1.2-2=-0.8. 
Comparing table 5 with table 1 indicates that PD_PL is in the same condition as Prisoner’s Dilemma. It 
means that when both learners participate completely and the value of their sheet is two, their payoff is 0.4, 
which is more than the situation where none of them makes effort. In condition that one makes more effort 
and its sheet score is two and his teammate obtains zero in his sheet, the first learner payoff is -0.8 and the 
second learner’s payoff is 1.2. That is, the learner who makes more effort has lower payoff than that of the 
teammate.  
As mentioned, we run the mechanism in several sessions. Therefore, even if a high-effort learner faces a 
free rider, he can persuade the teammate to make more effort in the next sessions. He can even change the 
teammate to achieve higher payoff. Hence, PD_PL motivates the learners to make more efforts and achieve 
higher payoff, resulting in more learning achievement. 
 
3-3- Review the PD_PL in terms of Peer Learning requirements 
In subsection 2-1, several requirements of Peer Learning were enumerated. Table 6 shows how we meet 
these requirements in our mechanism.  
 
Table 6: Implementing Peer Learning requirements in PD_PL 
 
Context Mechanism is designed for educational and learning area 
Objectives The goal is to improve learning  
Curriculum area In addition to instructor training, mid-term exam and final exam, the PD_PL helps 
learning improvement based on Peer Learning. 
Participants The participants are a number of Computer Engineering learners in courses 
“Fundamentals of programming”, “Discrete mathematics” and “Compiler principles 
techniques and tools”. 
Helping technique Learners help each other by writing their knowledge on sheets and exchanging their 
sheets.  
Contact Method In every mechanism execution session, the learners can contact each other. They can 
contact each other during the semester as well. This raises an opportunity for learners 
to choose new teammate or persuade previous teammate to make more effort in order 
to obtain higher payoff in next mechanism iterations. 
Materials After each run of mechanism, learners need internet to observe their payoffs. 
Training Before the start of mechanism, learners are trained about the method of mechanism 
and scoring method. 
Process monitoring The quality of proposed mechanism is controlled by comparing the scores of pre-tests 
and post-tests. The instructor monitors the mechanism execution as well.  
Assessment of learners tactic Learners assess teammates’ and their own sheets every time the mechanism is 
executed. 
Evolution method  The effect of mechanism is controlled by comparing post-test to pre-test results. 
Feedback Every time the mechanism is run, learners can provide their opinions about the 
method and quality of procedure in the educational network. Moreover, at the end, 
they are asked to fill in a questionnaire about the execution of mechanism. The result 
of questionnaire will be indicated in the result section. 
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We also illustrate this condition with a simple numerical example in Table
4. As an example, if the score of a student is zero and the value of his
teammate is two, the score of each one is (0 + 2)/2 × 1.2 = 1.2. Therefore,
the payoff for the student is equal to 1.2 − 0 = 1.2 and the payoff for their
teammate is 1.2− 2 = −0.8.
Comparing Table 4 with Table 1, one can see that PD PL is in fact a
prisoner’s dilemma game. It means that when both students participate
and cooperate and the score is 2, their payoff is 0.4, which is more than
the situation where none of them makes any effort. In the case that one
makes more effort and his sheet score is 2 but his teammate obtains zero, the
student’s payoff is −0.8 and his teammate’s payoff is 1.2. That is, the student
who makes more effort has a lower payoff than that of their teammate.
As mentioned, we run the mechanism in several sessions. Therefore, even
if a high-effort student faces a free rider, he can persuade their teammate to
make more effort in the next few sessions. He can even change the team-
mate to achieve a higher payoff. Hence, PD PL motivates the students to
make more efforts and achieve higher payoffs, resulting in higher learning
achievement.
4.4 Peer Learning Requirements in PD PL
In Section 2.1, several requirements of peer learning were enumerated. Table
5 shows how we meet these requirements in our mechanism.
5 Methodology
In this section, we describe how to implement the mechanism and how to
analyze the results. Figure 3 shows the complete process of PD PL imple-
mentation.
At first, we asked the instructor to select a number of students randomly.
Next, we explained the stages of PD PL and the scoring method to the
selected students. We only told to them that our mechanism and scoring was
set according to game theory. The majority of students had no knowledge
about game theory, but some students knew about game theory through the
movie “Beautiful Mind”.
In the first session, we taught how to register and enter the educational
network in order to view the scores after each PD PL execution. In almost in
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Table 5: Implementing peer learning requirements in PD PL.
Context Mechanism is designed for the educational and learning area
Objectives The goal is to improve learning
Curriculum
area
In addition to instructor training, mid-term exam and final exam,
the PD PL facilitates learning improvement based on peer learning.
Participants The participants are a number of Computer Engineering students in
courses “Fundamentals of programming”, “Discrete mathematics”,
and “Compiler principles techniques and tools”.
Helping tech-
nique
Students help each other by writing their knowledge on sheets and
exchanging their sheets.
Contact
Method
In every mechanism execution session, the students can contact
each other. They can contact each other during the semester as
well. This raises an opportunity for students to choose new team-
mate or persuade previous teammate to make more effort in order
to obtain a higher payoff in the next iterations of the mechanism.
Materials After each run of the mechanism, students need to use internet to
observe their payoffs.
Training Before the start of the mechanism, students are trained about the
method of mechanism and scoring method.
Process moni-
toring
The quality of the proposed mechanism is controlled by comparing
the scores of pre-tests and post-tests. The instructor monitors the
mechanism execution as well.
Assessment of
students tac-
tic
Students assess teammates’ and their own sheets every time the
mechanism is executed.
Evolution
method
The effect of the mechanism is controlled by comparing post-test
to pre-test results.
Feedback Every time the mechanism is run, students can provide their opin-
ions about the method and quality of procedure in the educational
network. Moreover, at the end, they are asked to fill in a ques-
tionnaire about the execution of the mechanism. The result of the
questionnaire will be indicated in the result section
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4. Methodology 
In this section, we describe how to implement the mechanism and how to analyze the results. 
 
4-1- Implementation and data collection 
Figure 4 shows the complete process of PD_PL implementation. At first, we selected a number of learners 
randomly. They were learners of Computer Engineering who enrolled in four groups “Fundamentals of 
Programming” (two different groups), “Discrete Mathematics”, and “Compiler principles techniques and 
tools” courses. We ran the proposed mechanism in semesters autumn and spring 2016.  
After selecting the learners, we explained the stages of PD_PL and the scoring method to selected learners. 
We only told to learners that our mechanism and scoring was according to Game Theory. The majority of 
learners had no knowledge about Game Theory, but some learners knew the Game Theory through movie 
“Beautiful Mind”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Stages of PD_PL implementation 
 
 
In the first session, we taught how to register and enter in educational network and how to view the scores 
after each time PD_PL is run. Almost in every session that we ran PD_PL, we described the scoring 
method. The user manual and the scoring method were also placed in the educational network. After each 
PD_PL execution, top three scores of learners in that session were also placed in the education network. 
In each selected session, after the instructor taught all learners, including those chosen and those who were 
not chosen to participate in mechanism, we asked the selected learners to stay in the class. Then, we asked 
the learners to choose a teammate. The learners were allowed to select a different teammate in different 
sessions. Then we handed the sheets to learners and asked them to write about a requested concept briefly. 
Figure 5 shows a sample sheet that we gave to learners. The parts defined for assessment of teammate’s 
sheet, self-assessment and familiarity with the teammate are observable in bottom of sheet. 
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Figure 3: Stages of PD PL implementation
every session that we ran PD PL, we described the scoring method. The user
manual and the scoring method were also placed in the education l et .
After each PD PL execution, top three scores of students in that session were
also placed in the education network.
In each selected session, after the instructor taught all the stu ents - in-
cluding those chosen and those who were not chosen to participate in mech-
anism - we asked the selected students to stay in the classroom. Then, we
asked the students to choose a teammate. The students were allowed to se-
lect a different teammate in different sessions. Then we handed the sheets to
students and asked them to write about a requested concept briefly. Figure
4 shows a sample sheet that we gave to students. The parts defined for as-
sessment of the teammate’s sheet, self-assessment, and familiarity with the
teammate are observable at the bottom of the sheet.
5.1 Participants
The participants were 142 students of Computer Engineering who enrolled
in the courses “Fundamentals of Programming” (two different groups), “Dis-
crete Mathematics”, and “Compiler principles techniques and tools”. We ran
the proposed mechanism in the autumn and spring semesters of 2016.
At the analysis stage, we would eliminate 23 students who participated
in less than 3 sessions of PD PL execution. The information of remaining
students is shown in Table 6.
For each selected course, we were going to run the mechanism in almost
half of the sessions of a semester, so that the mechanism was run in seven dif-
ferent sessions of the semester. As we chose four groups (Including two groups
17
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Figure 5: A sample of sheet that learners write about the requested concept 
 
 
For each course selected, we were going to run the mechanism in almost half of the sessions of a semester, 
so the mechanism was run in seven different sessions of the semester.  As we chose four groups (Including 
two groups of “Fundamentals of Programming” and one group of each other courses), the mechanism was 
executed in 28 sessions. Table 7 shows the applied during these sessions regarding to each selected course. 
We selected 142 learners randomly in selected courses. In analysis stage, we would eliminate 23 learners 
who participated in less than 3 sessions of PD_PL execution. The information of remaining learners is 
shown in Table 8. 
 
Table 7: The concepts used in sessions in which the mechanism was executed  
Course Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Session 5 Session 6 Session 7 
Fundamentals of 
Programming 
Cout / Cin 
instruction 
Operators Priority 
For instruction 
While 
Instruction 
Array 
Switch 
Instruction 
Function 
Call 
Function by 
Value and 
Reference 
Discrete 
Mathematics 
Reflexive, 
Symmetric, 
Transitive 
Properties 
Surjective and 1-1 
function  
Semi Group 
Isomorphism 
Property 
Partial Order Lattices 
Boolean 
Algebra 
Compiler 
principles 
techniques and 
tools 
FirstPosition 
Concept 
FollowPosition 
Concept 
Types of 
Error in 
Compiler 
First/First 
and 
First/Follow 
Collision 
LL Grammar 
Closure 
Concept 
SLR 
Grammar 
 
 
Figure 4: A sample of sheet that students write about the requested concept
of “Fundamentals of Programming” and one group of each other courses),
the mechanism was executed i 28 sessions. Table 7 s ows the concepts used
during these sessions in relation to each selected cour e.
5.2 Data Analysis Method
Figure 5 shows the complete process of analysing our collected data. At first,
the appropriate software to analyze the data is chosen. Then, as we used
“Paired Hotelling’s T-Square” to compare pre-test and post-test data and
this test is unable to work with missing values, we explain the missing value
imputation methods that we have used. Finally, using Paired Hotelling’s
T-Square, we investigated whether the proposed mechanism has a positive
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Table 6: The number of students who participate in more than two sessions
of the mechanism as separated by course.
12 
 
 
 
Table 8: The number of learners who participate in more than two sessions of the 
mechanism as separated by courses 
 
Course Title 
The number 
of women 
The number 
of men 
Total 
Number 
Fundamentals of Programming (2 groups) 22 45 67 
Discrete Mathematics 9 20 29 
Compiler principles techniques and tools 20 3 23 
 
4-2- Data Analysing Method 
Figure 6 shows the complete process of collected data analysis. To analyze the effect of mechanism, we 
compare pre-test and post-test scores. For this purpose, we calculate the average scores of learners in pre-
test and post-test in mechanism execution session individually. To investigate the significance of difference 
between pre-test and post-test, we apply “Paired Hotelling’s T-Square” test. We need some requirements for 
using this test, which are explained in detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The data analysis stages 
 
4-2-1 Selecting R as a tool of data analysis 
To analyze the data, we use R programming Language that is known as the most widely used software in 
data mining and data science [27] . R is an open source software. We use version 3.3.3 of this software as 
well as version 1.0.136 of RStudio that is a graphical interface of R.  
 
4-2-2 Missing Data Imputation 
As noted, the mechanism was executed in 28 sessions. Some learners were absent in some sessions. So, we 
face some missing values, and to use “Paired Hotelling’s T-Square”, missing data have to be imputed. We 
apply four missing data imputation methods including using mean, using median, K Nearest Neighbour 
(KNN) and Fuzzy K-Mean Clustering (FKM). We use R to program each method. For KNN, we use the 
package offered in article [29] .     
FKM missing imputation is an efficient method [30]  that clusters data using FKM algorithm and then fills 
missed data based on the their degrees of membership. In the FKM, each data belongs to all the clusters 
with different degrees of membership. Figure 8 shows the FKM algorithm in which each data “Xi” (1iN)  
includes “S” fields. In our work, N equals to 119, which is the number of learners.  
As we execute our mechanism in 7 sessions of each course, we have 7 pre-tests and 7 post-test for each 
group. Therefore, each learner had 14 scores in their post-tests and pre-tests, and so in our mechanism, the 
value of “S” is 14. 
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Table 7: The concepts used in sessions in which the mechanism were exe-
cuted.
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For each course selected, we were going to run the mechanism in almost half of the sessions of a semester, 
so the mechanism was run in seven different sessions of the semester.  As we chose four groups (Including 
two groups of “Fundamentals of Programming” and one group of each other courses), the mechanism was 
executed in 28 sessions. Table 7 shows the applied during these sessions regarding to each selected course. 
We selected 142 learners randomly in selected courses. In analysis stage, we would eliminate 23 learners 
who participated in less than 3 sessions of PD_PL execution. The information of remaining learners is 
shown in Table 8. 
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effect on learning.
A more detailed explanation of our analysis of the data collected is in-
cluded below.
5.2.1 Selecting R as a tool of data analysis
To analyze the data, we use R programming language, which is known as the
most widely used software in ata mining a d data scie ce Piatetsky (2017).
R is an open source software. We used version 3.3.3 of this software as well
as version 1.0.136 of RStudio, which is a graphical interface of R.
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Table 8: The number of learners who participate in more than two sessions of the 
mechanism as separated by courses 
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Discrete Mathematics 9 20 29 
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4-2- Data Analysing Method 
Figure 6 shows the complete process of collected data analysis. To analyze the effect of mechanism, we 
compare pre-test and post-test scores. For this purpose, we calculate the average scores of learners in pre-
test and post-test in mechanism execution session individually. To investigate the significance of difference 
between pre-test and post-test, we apply “Paired Hotelling’s T-Square” test. We need some requirements for 
using this test, which are explained in detail. 
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As noted, the mechanism was executed in 28 sessions. Some learners were absent in some sessions. So, we 
face some missing values, and to use “Paired Hotelling’s T-Square”, missing data have to be imputed. We 
apply four missing data imputation methods including using mean, using median, K Nearest Neighbour 
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Figure 5: The data analysis stages
5.2.2 Missing Data Imputation
As noted, the mechanism was executed throughout 7 sessions of each course.
Some students were absent for some sessions. Therefore we faced some miss-
ing values, and to use Paired Hotelling’s T-Square, missing data had to be
imputed. So we apply four missing data imputation methods including using
mean, using median, K Nearest Neighbour (KNN) and Fuzzy K-Mean Clus-
tering (FKM). We used R to program each method. For KNN, we used the
package offered in article Kowarik and Templ (2016).
FKM missing imputation is an efficient method Schmitt et al. (2015) that
clusters data using an FKM algorithm and then fills in the missing data based
on degrees of membership. In the FKM, each piece of data belongs to all the
clusters with different degrees of membership. Algorithm 1 shows the FKM
method in which each data Xi(1 ≤ i ≤ N) includes “S” fields. In our work,
N equals to 119, which is the number of students.
As we execute our mechanism throughout the 7 sessions of each course,
we have 7 pre-tests and 7 post-tests for each group. Therefore, each student
has 14 scores in their post-tests and pre-tests, and so in our mechanism, the
value of “S” is 14.
The algorithm initially chooses K data randomly out of the total data
as K clusters’ center (the second line of the algorithm). These centers are
shown as V (0). Then, the distance of each piece of data from these K cen-
ters is calculated (line 9). In the next step, the degree of membership of
each piece of data in the centers of the K clusters is calculated (line 11).
The value m refers to a FuzzificationParameter that is usually equal to 2
Hathaway and Bezdek (2001). When a data includes some missing fields, we
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Algorithm 1 Fuzzy K-Mean Clustering Hathaway and Bezdek (2001)
1: Input N data Xi, such that (1 ≤ i ≤ N)
2: Set randomly k initial centers as V (0).
3: Set iteration number r = 0
4: do
5: {
6: for each (1 ≤ i ≤ N) do
7: for each (1 ≤ j ≤ N) do
8: Calculate distance of Xi from center of cluster j:
9: d(Vj, Xi) = (Σ
n
i=1|Xis − Vjs|p)
1
p
10: Calculate degree of membership of Xi in cluster j:
11: U(Vj, Xi) =
(d(Vj ,Xi))
−2
m−1
ΣKc=1(d(Vc,Xi))
−2
m−1
12: end for
13: end for
14: for each (1 ≤ j ≤ K) do
15: Update new centers of clusters:
16: V r+1j =
Σni=1U(Vj ,Xi)×Xi
Σni=1U(Vj ,Xi)
17: end for
18: r = r + 1
19: }while(‖V r+1 − V r‖ ≥ )
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use PartialDistanceStrategy Hathaway and Bezdek (2001) to calculate the
distance:
d(Xi, Vk) =
S
Ii
√
2ΣSj=1(Xij − Vkj)2Iij
Such that
Iij =
{
0 if Xij is missing value
1 otherwise
Ii = Σ
S
j=1Iij
(3)
Afterward, the new center of each cluster is defined using the weighted
mean of the data existing in that cluster (line 16). The algorithm is repeated
until the distance between two consecutive centers is higher than a defined
threshold. When the distance is lower than the threshold, the algorithm will
be stopped (line 19).
After clustering, the missing fields of data are imputed according to their
degrees of membership. As an example, to impute the missing field j of Xi,
we can use the following equation.
Xij =
ΣKk=1U(Vk, Xi)× Vkj
ΣKk=1U(Vk, Xi)
, (4)
Where, Vkj refers to field j of the center of cluster k, and U(Vk, Xi) refers
to the degree of membership of Xi in the center of cluster k.
5.2.3 Using Paired Hotelling’s T-Square to Data Analysis
Paired Hotelling’s T-Square is an extended version of Paired t-test in mul-
tivariate situation. The Paired t-test is a statistical test that determines
whether the mean difference between two groups of observations is zero.
Suppose we are interested in evaluating the effectiveness of a training pro-
gram. We can measure the performance of a sample of students before and
after the training program, and examine the differences using a Paired t-test.
The Paired t-test has two opposite hypotheses; the null hypothesis (H0)
and the alternative hypothesis (H1). The H0 assumes that the true mean
difference between the paired samples is zero. The two-tailed H1 assumes
that the difference is not equal to zero.
Suppose (x1, y1), (x2, y2), ., (xn, yn) are pointing to a sample of a popula-
tion where xi and yi refer to before and after observations. H0 and H1 are
defined as below:
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H0 : µx = µy
H1 : µx 6= µy
(5)
The values of µx and µy refer to mean of x and y. If relation 6 is true,
we reject the null hypothesis at signicant level α (with α chance of being
mistaken) CHEN (2013); Johnson and Wichern (2002). The popular value
of α are 0.1, 0.05, or 0.01. In our research, we set α to 0.05.
T 2 =
(d¯)2
s2
n
= nd¯(s2)−1d¯ > t2n−1(
α
2
) (6)
In relation 6, d¯ = 1
n
Σni=1di , where di = xi − yi and S2 = 1n−1Σ(di − d¯)2 is
the variance of samples. The value of t2n−1(
α
2
) denotes the upper 100(α/2)th
percentile of the t-distribution with n− 1 degree of free.
As denoted, for each group, PD PL was executed in 7 sessions and on
different concepts. If each concept is considered a variable, we face a mul-
tivariate problem. Therefore, we should investigate the effect of our mech-
anism on these different concepts by comparing the scores of pre-tests with
post-tests.
In Paired Hotelling’s T-Square, all scalar observations of the Paired t-
test are replaced with vectors of observations. When post-tests and pre-
tests are measured for the variables (p variables, of which there are 7 in our
mechanism), we compute vectors of differences ([post-tests]-[pre-tests]):
di =
 di1...
dip
 =
 xi1 − yi1...
xip − yip

for1 ≤ i ≤ N
(7)
We calculate the value:
T 2 = n(d¯)′S−1d¯ (8)
Such that:
d¯(p×1) =
1
n
Σni=1di
S(p×p) =
1
n− 1Σ
n
i=1(di − d¯)(di − d¯)′
(9)
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If the relation 10 is true, we reject the null hypothesis at signicant level
α.
T 2 = n(d¯)′S−1d¯ >
(n− 1)p
(n− p) Fp,n−p(α) (10)
The value of Fp,n−p(α) denotes the upper 100(α/2)th percentile of the
F-distribution with p and n− p degrees of free.
5.2.4 Bonferroni Correction
Any time we reject a null hypothesis, it is possible that we are wrong and the
null hypothesis might be really be true, and our significant result might be
coincidence. The α value of 0.05 means that there is a 5% chance of getting
our observed result if the null hypothesis is true McDonald (2014).
The rejection of a true null hypothesis is called a type I error. When
we test multiple hypotheses in multivariate situations, α is the probability
of making at least one Type I error in multiple hypotheses. The Bonferroni
correction is a classic method to solve the problem Abdi (2007); McDonald
(2014) that tests each individual hypothesis at a significance level of α/m
where alpha is the chosen overall alpha level and m is the number of hy-
potheses.
In our mechanism, we are going to compare seven pre-tests to seven post-
tests. So we use α/7 instead of α.
6 Results
In this section, we analyze the data of PD PL implementation and answer
to research questions.
6.1 Learning Improvement
To answer research question 1, which was about our mechanism’s effect on
learning improvement, we use Paired Hotelling’s T-Square.
Table 8 shows a descriptive statistic of pre-tests and post-tests according
to the 28 PD PL executions. The table shows the number of students, the
mean, minimum score, maximum score, and the standard deviation of scores
of each session, per course and in total.
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Table 8: The numbers of students, mean, minimum score, maximum score,
and standard deviation of scores of each session per courses and in total.
16 
 
Table 9: The numbers of learners, mean, minimum score, maximum score, and standard deviation of scores of each session per 
courses and in total. 
Course Name 
Session 
Number 
Test 
Number of 
Learners 
Minimum 
Score 
Maximum 
Score 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Fundamentals 
of 
Programming 
Session 1 
Pre-test 52 .00 2.00 1.7077 .48420 
Post-test 52 .00 2.00 1.6692 .45656 
Session 2 
Pre-test 60 .00 2.00 1.2450 .67131 
Post-test 60 .00 2.00 1.3850 .56705 
Session 3 
Pre-test 54 .00 2.00 1.0602 .74596 
Post-test 54 .00 2.00 1.3287 .73302 
Session 4 
Pre-test 45 .00 2.00 1.1589 .77586 
Post-test 45 .00 2.00 1.4544 .74953 
Session 5 
Pre-test 55 .00 2.00 1.2136 .60938 
Post-test 55 .00 2.00 1.6636 .59942 
Session 6 
Pre-test 48 .00 2.00 1.5208 .68190 
Post-test 48 .00 2.00 1.6042 .63755 
Session 7 
Pre-test 51 .00 2.00 1.1745 .78233 
Post-test 51 .00 2.00 1.6853 .65386 
Discrete 
Mathematics 
Session 1 
Pre-test 23 .00 2.00 .8174 .58126 
Post-test 23 .20 2.00 1.5739 .42342 
Session 2 
Pre-test 27 .00 2.00 1.2407 .65590 
Post-test 27 .00 2.00 1.5000 .67937 
Session 3 
Pre-test 19 .00 2.00 .9505 .58112 
Post-test 19 .00 2.00 1.6116 .61750 
Session 4 
Pre-test 20 .00 2.00 .9500 .93048 
Post-test 20 .00 2.00 1.3875 .72763 
Session 5 
Pre-test 26 .00 2.00 1.8365 .46337 
Post-test 26 1.50 2.00 1.9808 .09806 
Session 6 
Pre-test 26 .00 2.00 1.7019 .51000 
Post-test 26 1.00 2.00 1.8654 .26675 
Session 7 
Pre-test 24 .00 2.00 1.6042 .70679 
Post-test 24 .00 2.00 1.8958 .41649 
Compiler 
principles 
techniques and 
tools 
Session 1 
Pre-test 8 .00 2.00 1.5000 .70711 
Post-test 8 .00 2.00 1.7500 .41677 
Session 2 
Pre-test 22 1.00 2.00 1.5682 .09869 
Post-test 22 1.75 2.00 1.9545 .42705 
Session 3 
Pre-test 23 .50 2.00 1.5348 .28509 
Post-test 23 1.25 2.00 1.7826 .54814 
Session 4 
Pre-test 22 .00 1.75 .7386 .52430 
Post-test 22 .00 2.00 1.1818 .61951 
Session 5 
Pre-test 22 .00 2.00 .7386 .60347 
Post-test 22 .00 2.00 1.6818 .76577 
Session 6 
Pre-test 17 .00 2.00 1.3529 .70450 
Post-test 17 .00 2.00 1.5588 .58579 
Session 7 
Pre-test 21 .00 2.00 1.1905 .42817 
Post-test 21 .50 2.00 1.6667 .68129 
Total 
Session 1 
Pre-test 83 .00 2.00 1.4410 .47251 
Post-test 83 .00 2.00 1.6506 .63297 
Session 2 
Pre-test 109 .00 2.00 1.3092 .58076 
Post-test 109 .00 2.00 1.5284 .68194 
Session 3 
Pre-test 96 .00 2.00 1.1522 .65521 
Post-test 96 .00 2.00 1.4934 .77709 
Session 4 
Pre-test 87 .00 2.00 1.0046 .69598 
Post-test 87 .00 2.00 1.3701 .68750 
Session 5 
Pre-test 103 .00 2.00 1.2694 .53493 
Post-test 103 .00 2.00 1.7476 .65856 
Session 6 
Pre-test 91 .00 2.00 1.5412 .57961 
Post-test 91 .00 2.00 1.6703 .74133 
Session 7 
Pre-test 96 .00 2.00 1.2854 .56080 
Post-test 96 .00 2.00 1.7339 56080 
 
As Table 9 illustrates, the average scores of post-tests are higher than those of the pre-tests in all sessions 
except the first session of “Fundamentals of Programming”. This session was the first one at which our 
mechanism was run, and we asked the leaners to write about two relatively dense concepts. This exhausted 
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As Table 8 illustrates, the average scores of post-tests were higher than
those of the pre-tests in all sessions; except for the first session of “Fun-
damentals of Programming”. This session was the first one in which our
mechanism was run, and we asked the students to write about two relatively
dense concepts. This exhausted the students, and consequently curtailed
their performance. In other sessions, in consultation with the instructor,
concepts that took between 5 to 10 minutes to be written about were chosen.
Figure 6 shows the difference between the post-test and the pre-test scores
of each session per course and in total.
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Figure 6: The chart of difference between pre-tests and post-test per course
and in total. The dark parts show pre-test and the light parts show difference
between post-test and pre-test. In fact, the light part of each column shows
the amount of learning improvement
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Table 9: The value of Paired Hotelling’s T-Square after each of the mentioned
missing data imputation methods
Method of missing data imputation T 2
Using Mean 384.009
Using Median 439.5052
KNN 365.9887
FKM (run 1) 352.7527
FKM (run 2) 353.3958
FKM (run 3) 352.5303
As noted, using Paired Hotelling’s T-Square we examined whether there
were a significant difference between the pre-test and post-test scores. We
used the missing data imputation as a requirement of Paired Hotelling’s T-
Square. With the FKM method, as the first centers of clusters are randomly
selected, the degree of membership of data (including data that contains
missing fields) in the centers may be different. Therefore, we ran the FKM
missing data imputation algorithm three times.
At first, we calculated the value of (n−1)p
(n−p) Fp,n−pα. The value of n refers to
the number of data that is equal to 119, and p refers to number of comparison,
which is equal to 7 in our test.
(n− 1)p
(n− p) Fp,n−p(
α
7
) =
(119− 1)7
(119− 7) F7,11−7(
0.05
7
)
=
118× 7
112
× 2.948244 = 21.7433
Table 9 shows the value of Hotelling’s T-Square regarding Equation(8)
after using different missing data imputation methods.
As shown in Table 9, the value of Paired Hotelling’s T-Square was higher
than (n−1)p
(n−p) Fp,n−pα value in all situations. Therefore, we can reject H0 and
conclude that our mechanism (based on prisoner’s dilemma and peer learn-
ing) enhances learning.
In another analysis of the pre-tests and post-test results, we found that the
proposed mechanism could increase learning outcome from 4.17% to 47.2%.
We subtracted the mean value of post-test scores from the mean value of
pre-test scores for each course and session. The column “Mean of post-test
minus Mean of pre-test” in Table 10 shows the results. The positive values
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show increasing scores in post-tests and consequent learning enhancement.
Except for the first session of the “Fundamentals of Programming”, the pre-
test scores were higher than the pre-test scores, which meant that PD PL
had a positive impact on learning outcomes. The column “Percentage” of
Table 10 expresses the difference between the post-test and pre-test scores.
The difference between the post-test and pre-test scores is expressed as a
percentage. By ignoring the first session of “Fundamentals of Programming”,
the minimum learning improvement is 4.17% and the maximum is 47.2%.
Table 10: Difference between the mean of pre-test and post-test scores per
course and session
Session 
Number 
Mean of post-test minus Mean of pre-test Percentage 
Fundamentals 
of 
Programming 
Discrete 
Mathematics 
Compiler 
principles 
techniques and 
tools 
Total 
Fundamentals 
of 
Programming 
Discrete 
Mathematics 
Compiler 
principles 
techniques and 
tools 
Total 
Session 1 -0.03846 0.756522 0.25 0.209639 -1.92308 37.82609 12.5 10.48193 
Session 2 0.14 0.259259 0.386364 0.219266 7 12.96296 19.31818 10.9633 
Session 3 0.268519 0.661053 0.247826 0.34125 13.42593 33.05263 12.3913 17.0625 
Session 4 0.295556 0.4375 0.443182 0.365517 14.77778 21.875 22.15909 18.27586 
Session 5 0.45 0.144231 0.943182 0.478155 22.5 7.211538 47.15909 23.90777 
Session 6 0.083333 0.163462 0.205882 0.129121 4.166667 8.173077 10.29412 6.456044 
Session 7 0.510784 0.291667 0.47619 0.448438 25.53922 14.58333 23.80952 22.42188 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2 Free rider prevention
The second research question was about our mechanism’s ability to prevent
free riding. Sometimes students may not know that they are doing less than
the norm, therefore seeing the scores and what their peers are doing may
encourage them to make more effort in future sessions Ark (2017). In PD PL,
students have the opportunity to assess themselves and their peers on how
much they do. In addition, at the end of each mechanism run, students
could see teammates’ and their own scores in the educational network. On
the other hand, the students may really face free riders and have to do all
the work. In this case, students may optimistically persuade their cohort to
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make more effort in subsequent sessions. They can even change their cohort
in the next sessions to escape the free rider problem.
Since students may choose different teammates in different sessions it
is supposed that after several sessions, they can select a proper partner to
collaborate in the learning process and subsequently obtain more payoffs.
Given that some students may be absent from some sessions, we did some
preliminary research to investigate how many of the groups were formed with
the same members at the future sessions. We found in sessions 2 through
7 that 37.83%, 41.05%, 58.33%, 59.78%, 62.5% and 64.9% of the groups were
formed by previous members for each respective session. For example, 37.83%
of the first session’s teammates were also in a group in session 2. An increase
in the percentage groups’ reformation shows that students gradually tended
to choose one student as their cohort. Further research needs to be done to
demonstrate effective parameters in group formation. We plan to develop
this point in the next version of PD PL.
6.3 Subjective evaluation
Students acceptance and usage are important measures of a mechanism’s
success. In early sessions of PD PL implementation, some students were
worried about the amount of work that they had to do. Their initial im-
pressions were that contributing in pre-tests and post-tests and filling in the
sheets might be tedious. In later sessions, when they understood the positive
effect of PD PL on their learning improvement, they had more motivation to
participate in the mechanism. Interestingly, the teacher stated that during
sessions in which the mechanism was not run, the students were following up
and willing to run the mechanism.
However in Section 4.2, we stated some requirements of a peer learning
environment. The last item mentioned was about giving the students feed-
back on PD PL. For this purpose, we prepared a questionnaire and asked
students to fill it in. Figure 7 shows the questions and a representation of
students’ answers.
According to Figure 7, some conclusions are drawn. For instance, the an-
swers to questions 1 through 5 showed the positive effect of the mechanism
on learning enhancement. Questions 6 and 7 investigated the mechanism
from viewpoints of competition and cooperation, and responses suggested
that the PD PL tended to increase rates of cooperation rather than competi-
tion. The answers to question 8 indicated that the mechanism was attractive
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for students. Finally, the outcome of question 9 indicated that a facility
like the educational network had a positive influence on the mechanism’s
performance.
54% 
59% 
49% 
56% 
51% 
40% 
51% 49% 
65% 
18% 
18% 
29% 
25% 25% 
33% 
30% 
23% 23% 
28% 
23% 22% 
19% 
24% 
27% 
19% 
28% 
12% 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5 Question 6 Question 7 Question 8 Question 9
SA/Agreed Neutural SD/Disagreed
 1. The PD_PL has enhanced my learning 
performance.  
2. The PD_PL has motivated me to pay more 
attention to learning.  
3. The study of teammate’s sheet has a positive 
effect on finding and learning what I did not 
learn completely.  
4. I think optionally choosing the teammate is an 
effective aspect of this mechanism.  
5. Self-assessment and teammate assessment made 
me pay more attention to writing my sheet and 
reading teammate’s sheet.  
6. The PD_PL made me seek a way to increase my 
score individually.  
7. The PD_PL made me and my teammate look for 
a way to enhance scores.  
8. The PD_PL is an attractive learning method.  
9. Using the educational network made the process 
of PD_PL more transparent. 
 
Figure 7: Feedback of students on PD PL
7 Discussion
Implementation of the mechanism faced several challenges. For example,
as Table 8 shows, the average scores of post-tests were higher than those
of the pre-tests in all sessions except the first session of “Fundamentals of
Programming”. This session was the first one during which PD PL was run,
and the instructor asked the students to write about two relatively dense con-
cepts. This tired the students, and consequently reduced their performance.
In other sessions, in consultation with the instructor, educational concepts
that took between 5 to 10 minutes to be written about were selected. As
another example, we can mention the preparation of the implementation re-
quirements. Preparing the pre-test and post-test questions, correcting them,
inserting the scores into the educational network, and monitoring its imple-
mentation and directing the students were a very difficult and time consuming
tasks for the researcher and the instructor of the course.
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8 Conclusion and future works
In this study, similarities in they situations of peer learning and prisoner’s
dilemma was used to propose PD PL as a game theoretical approach to peer
learning.
The proposed mechanism was implemented during several sessions with
142 students. The results of pre-test and post-test exams of for all the sessions
were compared using R software through Paired Hotelling’s T-Square analysis
to investigate the impacts of PD PL and the proposed instructional design
on students’ personal learning. As Paired Hotelling’s T-Square is not able to
function with missing data, we applied four different missing data imputation
methods including using mean, using median, K Nearest Neighbour (KNN)
and Fuzzy K-Mean Clustering (FKM). We also used Bonferroni correction
to solve the type I error in multivariate situations.
The preliminary evaluation indicated that the mechanism had a positive
effect on the the learning enhancement. It may be interpreted that PD PL
could propose an acceptable mapping between a prisoner’s dilemma atmo-
sphere and peer learning since in PD PL, the efforts of teammates resulted
in a higher payoff for both of them and consequently increased learning out-
comes. Since PD PL lets students see their teammates efforts, they might
escape the free rider problem by changing the teammate or persuading them
to be more active. In addition, the results of a subjective evaluation revealed
that the majority of students found PD PL to be an attractive and efficient
tool for learning enhancement. The most important findings are:
• Learning Improvement: Putting the students together and hopping
for the best is not appropriate peer learning implementation. PD PL
prepared a peer learning environment using prisoner’s dilemma. It
passed the preliminary verification process and had a positive effect on
learning enhancement.
• Free rider prevention: At its mostly poorly designed, peer learning may
for instance result in one person making all the effort. The ability to
see the teammate’s sheet and final score in the educational network
and being able to chang peers in different sessions is a way to prevent
the free rider problem.
• Subjective evaluation: The result of subjective research showed the
31
mechanism to be attractive. It also indicated that PD PL tended to-
wards cooperation in the learning process.
We encountered some limitations with PD PL implementation. As men-
tioned, the mechanism had been run during several sessions and the absence
of some students for some sessions made missing data in the pre-tests and
post-tests data. However, as described in the methodology section, we min-
imized the effect of the missing data by using a missing data imputations
algorithm. To increase accuracy, we also used four imputation methods in
parallel. Another problem we encountered was in cases the number of selected
students in a session was odd. To solve the problem, we told the odd-one
out student, who was alone and did not have a cohort, to participate alone.
We ignored this student at the analysis stage.
The proposed mechanism is a general method that can be implemented in
any blended environments that possess interaction and scoring ability. The
instructional design can also use this mechanism - even in custom classrooms.
More work is yet to be done to determine the teammate changing pattern
during different sessions. The research has raised many unanswered ques-
tions; for example, whether the teammates’ behavior in previous sessions
impacted the amount of knowledge written on the sheet in the next session.
There are different methods to choosing strategy in the iterated prisoner’s
dilemma PD (2017). As another interesting point, we aim to investigate
students’ behavior during sessions of PD PL implementation regarding the
mentioned methods in reference PD (2017).
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